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Abst rac t - -Th is  paper describes the results of an analysis of the Nash equilibrium in randonfly 
generated repeated games. We study two families of games: symmetric bimatrix games G(A, B) 
with B = A n- and nonsymmetric bimatrix games (the first includes the classical games of prisoner 
dilemma, battle of the sexes, and chickens). We use pure strategies, implemented by automaZa of size 
two, and different strategy domination criteria. We observe that, in this environment, the uniqueness 
and efficiency of equilibria outcomes is the typical result. @ 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights 
reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that  the behavior of economic agents that  interact repeatedly cannot be fully 
captured by simple static models. Repeated interaction allows agents to use punishment hreats  
to enforce part icular actions that  would not have been taken in a static framework. In many 
economic examples,  the long-term relationship consists of a sequence of repeated situations. This 
economic scheme can be modeled as a repeated game. A typical example of this type of interact ion 
occurs when many firms interact in a market. Usually, this interact ion is not carried out in a 
single period, but  rather on a long-term relationship. In this case, some "cooperat ive" behavior  
is observed, even when there is no commitment  among the actors. The possibi l ity of future 
punishment  yields cooperat ion in a noncooperat ive environment.  
Noncooperat ive game theory provides equi l ibr ium concepts in order to decide which type of 
behavior result is stable. The Nash equi l ibr ium [1] is the most classical and general ly accepted 
solution. 
We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting changes that have significantly improved the 
exposition. 
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Usually, several new equilibria appear when we compare a repeated game with a game corre- 
sponding to a single period. This result is known in the literature as the Folk theorem. Having 
many equilibria is good in some sense. It allows supporting many outcomes (including some 
"cooperative outcomes"). But it is not so good in another sense. The multiplicity of equilibria 
makes the prediction of the actual path of play very difficult. In some typical examples, there 
is a clear intuition on what should be the "natural" outcome of the game. For instance, in the 
prisoners dilemma game, (C,C) should be the result (see Section 5). Thus, we would like to see 
unique full cooperative outcomes as a result of only noncooperative assumptions. 
Several different approaches have been attempted towards this goal, but with almost no success 
in isolating the "cooperative" equilibrium. The most common approach focuses on refining the 
Nash solution (subgameperfection [2] and other refinements, see [3] for details). It reduces the 
equilibrium strategies but not the equilibrium payoffs, bringing up again a full Folk theorem. 
Thus, extra rationality assumptions have to be included in the model, because some "noncooper- 
ative outcomes" (D,D) in the prisoners dilemma game are hard to remove. Moreover, sometimes 
the only remaining equilibrium is just the noncooperative one [4]. 
Another approach includes some bounded rationality considerations on the complexity of the 
strategies or some preference for simple strategies and costs of strategies implementation. This 
research line was followed by [3,5,6] and others. A reduction of the equilibrium outcomes was 
obtained, but they failed to remove the noncooperative one, and in some cases, the full cooperative 
outcome was removed instead. 
We will present a model with only noncooperative assumptions. We wilt consider the Nash 
equilibrium solution and the standard elimination of dominated strategies. We will only deal 
with strategies implemented by automata of size two. Even though this is certainly a very simple 
context, it is a fully noncooperative situation. This class includes strategies (like tit-for-tat) that 
proved to be successful even in the presence of more complicated strategies (see the "tournament 
approach" presented in [7,8]). 
In our model, the noncooperative outcome will then be eliminated in the prisoners dilemma 
game (in this case, the full cooperative outcome and a not fully cooperative one remain as possible 
outcomes). 
Moreover, we will show that the typical result in a family of symmetric-games (including the 
prisoners dilemma game) is uniqueness. It is also observed that we typically obtain efficient 
unique outcomes. We will also show that the uniqueness i still more common in general games 
if we remove the symmetry. 
2. GAMES IN NORMAL FORM AND REPEATED GAMES 
A game of strategies in normal form could be described by a 3-tuple G = (N, A, u). N will be 
the set of players. We will deal with two-player games, then N = {1,2}. A is the action profile 
set, A = A1 x A2. For each player i E N ,  Ai is the set of available strategies, u = (ul, u2) is the 
payoff utility vector, where ui : A -~ R is the payoff function of player i. 
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is an action profile a* = (a~, a~) such as V al E A1, ul (a*) > ul(al ,  a.~) 
and Va2 c A2, u2(a*) >_ u~(a~,a2). 
The (infinitely) repeated game consists of a sequence of repetitions of a one-shot game. The 
sequence of outcomes will be evaluated with limit of the mean. 
2.1. P r i soners  D i lemma and Other  Classical  Games  
The prisoners dilemma (P = ({1, 2}, A, u)) is without a doubt the most studied game in game 
theory. This game can be described by the numeric example shown in Figure la. 
It is immediate to verify that the only Nash equilibrium in the one-shot gmne is (D,D) with 
payoff (0,0). However, the outcome (2,2) associated to the strategies (C,C) is naturally more 
C 
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(a) P&voffs matrix. (b) Possible quilibrium outcomes in the 
repeated game (Folk theorem). 
Figure 1. Prisoners dilemma. 
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(a) Game of chicken. (b) Battle of the sexes. 
Figure 2. Classical games. 
appealing. When the game is repeated over time, we have the classical Folk theorem, where the 
shaded area represents the equilibrium outcomes (Figure lb). 
We will also consider the classical games in Figure 2. 
3. USE OF  AUTOMATA IN  REPEATED GAMES 
The intuitive description of an automaton corresponds to that of an agent (a player) who may 
have diverse states of mind under which decisions are made. For example, a player that plays 
the constant strategy C in the infinitely repeated prisoners di lemma game has only one state of 
mind ("cooperative"). On the other hand, if he plays a trigger strategy, we could think that 
he has two states, an initial cooperative state and after any noncooperation, he may move to a 
noncooperative state where.he remains forever. 
The C-tit-for-tat (C-tft) strategy and D-tit-for-tat (D-tft) also correspond to individuals with 
two states of mind. 
The following is a formal description of a full automaton for player i. This will be denoted by 
a 4-tuple: M i  = (Mi, m° ,B i ,T i )  with Mi C N (N is the set of natural  numbers), ll.ii is the set 
of states, m i 0 is the initial state, Bi : 11,I~ -+ Ai is the behavior function, and Ti : M~ × A -~ 3~i 
is the transit ion function (where A = [ I  A~ is the actions profiles set). The transit ion function 
indicates how the automaton changes tates. When the transition function is restricted to T,. : 
M~ x A - i  -+ M:,, where for j ,  i C N and i # j : A_, = I ]  Aj,  the automaton Mi  will be called 
exact. 
The automaton will be said to be finite if k/L/ is a finite set. 
Given a strategy, we could define a full automaton that implements it, and given a full automa- 
ton, we could construct he associate strategy. The construction of an automaton start ing from 
the strategy could be done in several different forms, and we could give automata of different 
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sizes associated with the same strategy. However, there exists an automaton of minimal size that 
implements a given strategy. 
A strategy in an extensive-form game typically indicates the actions to be taken by a given 
player in all information sets (in which he/she plays). This is done so that when studying 
refinements, a player can tremble in a previous information set, and still have his/her strategy 
prescribe what to do in subsequent moves. Thus, each exact automata does not fully capture the 
notion of strategy. However, for the purpose of studying Nash equilibria, it will not make any 
difference if we consider full or exact automata. We use only exact automata. 
In Figure 3, we show examples of both types of automata. 
(D ,C)  ~ ~  ~ @  
(D,D)  D 
(a) Full automaton. Trigger strategy (with 
punishments todeviations of any player). 
(b) Exact automaton. Trigger strategy (with 
punishments todeviations of the opponent). 
Figure 3. 
Here the behavior functions are indicated in the circles of the corresponding states, and the 
arches between states indicate the transitions. The initial states are the first to the left, and 
arches without labeling include all the options not considered by the labeled arches. 
4. FOLK THEOREMS FOR GAMES PLAYED BY  
TWO-STATES AUTOMATA WITH EL IMINATION 
OF DOMINATED STRATEGIES 
There are many articles in the literature attempting to give priority to the preference for 
simpler strategies (see [5-7,9,10], etc.). 
We will deal with two-player games with two pure strategies for each player, and we will restrict 
our study to strategies implemented by automata of sizes at most two. We will consider strategic 
domination. 
A strategy fi of player i dominates another strategy 9.i of player i, in a strong way (SDom) if the 
outcomes obtained by player i by playing fi are strictly better than those obtained by playing gi 
against any strategy of the opponent (fi SDom g~ iff u.i(fi,rj) > ui(gi,rj) for all strategy rj of 
player j ¢ i). 
If the inequality is not strict, we have weak domination (WDom), and if we also require that for 
at least one strategy of the opponent, the inequality must be strict, we have regular domination 
(RDom). 
5. A STATISTIC STUDY OF NASH EQUIL IBR IUM 
IN GAMES PLAYED BY TWO-STATES AUTOMATA 
5.1. Classical Games  
For the prisoners dilemma, under the above-mentioned assumptions, we have the results shown 
in Figure 4. 
The effect of domination in classical games was very weak. Only in the prisoner dilemma game 
did we eliminate the noncooperative outcome (0,0), but we still had two remaining outcomes, 
(1,1) and (2,2). In the others games, there was no reduction in the number of outcomes. 
Game 
Randomly  Generated  Repeated  Ga ines  
Tab le  1. Number  of  equ i l ib r ium outcomes  w i thout  dominat ion .  
# NEO 
1 1 35 
2 2 79 
3 3 79 
4 t 79 
5 3 79 
6 4 79 
7 1 39 
8 1 210 
9 3 79 
10 3 79 
11 3 79 
12 1 35 
13 3 57 
14 1 79 
15 3 27 
16 1 35 
17 1 79 
18 4 18 
19 3 79 
20 2 79 
21 6 30 
22 1 35 
23 3 26 
24 4 34 
25 3 79 
26 9 79 
27 2 79 
28 3 35 
29 2 79 
30 4 32 
31 3 14 
32 2 79 
33 7 79 
34 3 79 
35 4 57 
36 1 210 
37 5 4 
38 3 10 
39 2 10 
40 2 4 
41 4 79 
42 3 41 
43 5 79 
44 3 4 
45 3 79 
46 6 26 
47 3 27 
48 2 79 
49 4 27 
50 1 39 
Wi thout  Dominat ion  
# Equ i l ib r ium Strateg ies  
12 
14 4 
52 7 
8 1 1 
52 4 
14 4 
57 52 
27 52 
18 15 23 
14 4 
12 
30 24 24 
2 4 
34 52 7 
35 5 
14 14 5 
12 
79 48 
12 
57 57 52 
79 14 
12 
34 34 15 
52 41 
57 52 7 
54 9 
15 15 8 8 26 
15 4 ii 
11 11 79 52 
4 1 
8 
12 
11 11 4 
79 52 
7 7 14 14 
2 4 
14 4 
26 21 21 8 54 
27 52 
12 
27 52 1 
1429 
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Tab le  2. Number  of  equ i l ibr ium outcomes  with different dominat ion .  
Game St rong  Dominat ion  
# EL # NEO 
1 8 1 35 
2 4 2 79 12 
3 0 3 79 14 4 
4 8 1 79 
5 0 3 79 52 7 
6 0 4 79 8 1 1 
7 5 1 39 
8 0 1 210 
9 0 3 79 
10 0 3 79 52 4 
11 0 3 79 14 4 
12 8 1 35 
13 0 3 57 57 52 
14 8 1 79 
15 0 3 27 27 52 
16 8 1 35 
17 8 1 79 
18 0 4 18 18 15 23 
19 0 3 79 14 4 
20 4 2 79 12 
21 0 6 30 30 24 24 
22 8 1 35 
23 0 3 26 2 4 
24 0 4 34 34 52 7 
25 0 3 79 35 5 
26 0 9 79 14 14 5 
27 2 2 79 12 
28 0 3 35 79 48 
29 4 2 79 12 
30 0 4 32 57 57 52 
31 0 3 14 79 14 
32 4 2 79 12 
33 0 7 79 34 34 15 
34 0 3 79 52 41 
35 0 4 57 57 52 7 
36 0 1 210 
37 0 5 4 11 11 79 
38 1 3 10 4 1 
39 4 2 10 8 
40 0 2 4 12 
41 0 4 79 11 11 4 
42 3 41 79 52 
43 0 5 79 7 7 14 
44 0 3 4 2 4 
45 0 3 79 14 4 
46 0 6 26 26 21 21 
47 0 3 27 27 52 
48 2 2 79 12 
49 0 4 27 27 52 1 
50 5 1 39 
# Equ i l ib r ium St rateg ies  
54 9 
15 15 8 8 26 
15 4 11 
52 
14 
8 54 
Randomly  Generated  Repeated  Games 
Table  2. (cont.)  
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Game 
#EL  
1 47 1 6 
2 25 2 41 
3 14 2 71 
4 37 1 45 
5 0 3 79 
6 23 2 41 
7 46 1 9 
8 0 1 210 
9 48 1 3 
10 23 2 51 
11 16 2 62 
12 47 1 6 
13 0 3 57 
14 37 1 45 
15 0 3 27 
16 47 1 6 
17 37 1 45 
18 8 4 13 
19 14 2 71 
20 37 1 45 
21 38 1 
22 47 1 6 
23 30 2 12 
24 6 4 34 
25 0 3 79 
26 20 4 28 
27 23 2 41 
28 0 3 35 
29 25 2 41 
30 0 4 32 
31 8 3 2 
32 25 2 41 
33 44 1 15 
34 6 3 79 
35 10 4 44 
36 0 1 210 
37 26 2 
38 36 2 10 
39 35 2 8 
40 50 1 1 
41 10 4 59 
42 0 3 41 
43 49 1 2 
44 30 3 4 
45 14 2 71 
46 38 1 
47 0 3 27 
48 23 2 41 
49 6 3 20 
50 46 1 9 
Regu lar  Dominat ion  
# NEO 
6 
14 
52 
9 
46 
14 
57 52 
27 52 
13 
14 
2 
34 
35 
9 
79 
6 
57 
79 
6 
Equ i l ib r ium St rateg ies  
14 23 
40 
52 7 
5 
8 8 
48 
57 52 
14 
52 14 
44 52 7 
61 14 
l 
4 4 4 
79 52 
2 
14 
27 
9 
20 
40 
52 
52 
26 
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Table 2. (cont.)  
Game 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
2O 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
4O 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
5O 
# EL 
50 
26 
14 
40 
0 
24 
50 
0 
50 
24 
16 
50 
0 
40 
0 
50 
40 
8 
14 
40 
40 
5O 
32 
6 
0 
22 
24 
0 
26 
0 
8 
26 
50 
6 
10 
0 
26 
36 
38 
5O 
10 
0 
50 
34 
14 
4O 
0 
24 
6 
5O 
# NEO 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
4 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3 
1 
Weak  Dominat ion  
1 
41 
71 
30 
79 
41 
1 
210 
1 
41 
62 
1 
57 
30 
27 
1 
30 
13 
71 
28 
1 
12 
34 
79 
28 
41 
35 
41 
32 
2 
41 
1 
79 
44 
210 
6 
6 
1 
59 
41 
1 
4 
71 
27 
41 
20 
1 
4 
14 
52 
7 
# Equ i l ib r ium St rateg ies  
41 
14 
57 52 
27 52 
13 
14 
2 
34 
35 
7 
79 
4 
57 
79 
4 
14 23 
52 7 
5 
48 
57 52 
14 
52 14 
44 52 7 
61 
1 
4 4 4 
79 52 
2 
14 
27 
7 
20 
52 
52 
30 
14 
30 
15 
i I I 
I I I 
3 
2 
1 
I 
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(a) Without domination. (b) Weak or regular domination. 
Figure 4. Nash equilibria in prisoners dilemma game. 
5.2 .  Symmetr ica l  Random Games 
We generated 50 random symmetric bimatrix games G(A, B) with B = A T. It includes the 
classical games of prisoner dilemma, battle of the sexes, and chickens. The entries were integer 
numbers in the range [-9, 9]. We obtained the results shown in Tables 1 3. 
In Table 1, we show the number of equilibrium outcomes with the different domination and in 
Table 2 without domination. In these tables, ~ NEO is the number of different Nash equilibrium 
outcomes in each randomly generated game; #Equil ibrium Strategies are the number of strategies 
leading to each equilibrium outcome in an decreasing order (for instance, in Game 2, there are two 
payoffs corresponding to different equilibrium strategies; 79 strategies give the first outcome and 
12 the second. This game has 91 equilibrium strategies with two different equilibrium outcomes); 
#EL  is the number of strategies eliminated under each domination criterion. 
In Table 3, we show the equilibrimn payoffs. #NO is the number of different outcomes. The 
references that appear together with the payoffs indicate the following: S that the equilibrium is 
symmetric, E that the equilibrium is efficient (Pareto Optimal), * that the equilibrium disappears, 
eliminating regular or weakly dominated strategies. 
Figure 5 shows the percentages of the number of equilibrium payoffs with and without domi- 
nation. 
0.4 
0.35 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0,05 
0 
' "Without-Dora.St roczg-Dorn" 
"ReguFar-Dom.Weak-Dom' ×--- 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
# Equilibrium Outcomes 
Figure 5. Symmetrical random games, percentages of the number of equilibrium 
payoffs with and without domination. 
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We can observe that the typical number of equilibria decreases from three to one with the use 
of weak or regular domination. We also observe that eliminated equilibria are not the efficient 
symmetrical (ES). The domination reduced the symmetrieal-nonefficient equilibria in 13% of the 
cases, nonsymmetrical-efficient in 3%, and nonsymmetrical-nonefficient in 15%. 
This certainly contrasts with the multiplicity observed in these cases for the classical games in 
the previous section. 
5.3. Nonsymmetr ica l  Random Games 
Then we generated 50 random games (not necessarily symmetric), under the same conditions 
of the previous section. We obtained the result in Tables 4 and 5. 
The references are the same as Tables 1-3, respectively. 
Without  the symmetrical restriction on the stage game, we found an enforcement of the equilib- 
rimn uniqueness in the repeated game. We also noted that under strong domination, no outcome 
is el iminated (only some strategies), weak and regular domination strength the uniqueness. 
We have observed in this case, that the domination reduced the amount of equilibrium in 
27.8%, nonefficient equilibrium in 50%, and efficient in 12%. 
Initially, in 38% of the cases, the amount of equilibrium was one. After elimination of domi- 
nated strategies, the uniqueness was the result in 58% of the cases independently of the type of 
domination used. 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
"Without-Dom.St~'ong-Dom" , 
"Regular-Dom" -- -×- - - 
"Weak-Dom" 
x 
v, 
211111 , 
3 4 5 
# Equi l ibr ium Outcomes  
Figure 6. Nonsymmetrical r ndom games, percentages of equilibrium outcomes with 
and without different domination. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN QUEST IONS 
The use of automata of size 2 and strategy domination gives a full noncooperative environment 
where the uniqueness and efficiency of the equilibrium outcomes is the typical result. It certainly 
contrasts with the corresponding results in classical games, and moreover, with the unrestricted 
Folk theorems. 
For this study, we used software that deals with automata of size 2. It would be interesting to 
relax the condition of the automata size, but it should be kept in mind that, in this case, several 
implementation difficulties can appear because of the large number of automata that one will 
have to manage. It would also be of interest o consider efinements of Nash equilibria. 
P~ndomly  Generated  Repeated  Games 
Tab le  4. Number  of equ i l ib r ium outcomes  with and w i thout  di f ferent dominat ion ,  
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Game 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
lO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
5O 
Wi thout  Dominat ion  St rong  Dominat ion  
#NEO #Equ i l ib r iumStrateg ies  # EL # NEO #Equ i l ib r ium St rateg ies  
3 79 45 41 0 3 79 45 41 
1 27 8 1 27 
1 18 8 1 18 
2 24 1 1 2 24 1 
4 79 18 15 6 0 4 79 18 15 6 
3 79 45 18 0 3 79 45 18 
6 45 27 27 22 19 8 0 6 45 27 27 22 19 8 
3 79 12 1 4 3 79 12 1 
1 24 11 1 24 
2 19 10 6 2 19 10 
2 46 11 0 2 46 11 
1 79 0 1 79 
1 8 4 1 8 
2 18 16 5 2 18 16 
4 79 23 20 13 0 4 79 23 20 13 
1 18 8 1 18 
1 79 8 1 79 
2 51 46 8 2 51 46 
2 79 10 8 2 79 i0  
1 3 0 1 3 
3 79 12 1 4 3 79 45 1 
1 27 5 1 27 
5 18 16 11 8 4 0 5 18 16 11 8 4 
2 14 5 4 2 14 5 
1 46 0 l 46 
2 57 21 4 2 57 21 
1 19 0 1 19 
1 46 0 1 46 
2 51 19 8 2 51 19 
2 79 10 8 2 79 10 
2 16 11 0 2 16 11 
3 57 45 27 0 3 57 45 27 
3 24 19  8 4 3 24 19 8 
3 57 34 24 0 3 57 34 24 
1 14 8 1 14 
1 18 8 1 18 
2 79 12 9 2 79 12 
3 45 27 27 0 3 45 27 27 
,l 79 11 7 4 0 4 79 11 7 4 
1 20 8 i 20 
1 51 8 1 51 
3 18 11 5 0 3 18 11 5 
1 79 17 1 79 
2 46 24 0 2 46 24 
2 16 5 0 2 16 5 
2 46 5 0 2 46 5 
1 79 8 1 79 
2 79 21 2 2 79 21 
I 46 0 1 46 
3 79 24 11 0 3 79 24 l l  
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Table  4. (cont.)  
G ame 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
3O 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
5O 
# EL 
0 
34 
46 
47 
47 
3 
38 
23 
44 
47 
6 
39 
49 
46 
48 
48 
37 
42 
37 
5 
23 
34 
46 
49 
4 
24 
3 
4 
4O 
37 
7 
19 
36 
5O 
49 
48 
25 
0 
18 
48 
48 
8 
43 
41 
7 
6 
37 
23 
7 
12 
Regu lar  Dominat ion  
#NEO # Equ i l ib r ium St rateg ies  
3 79 45 41 
1 27 
1 5 
1 6 
1 4 
3 79 45 15 
1 34 
2 41 9 
1 12 
1 6 
2 32 10 
1 35 
1 2 
1 8 
1 3 
1 3 
1 45 
2 6 6 
1 45 
1 2 
2 41 9 
1 25 
2 4 4 
1 2 
1 33 
2 41 16 
1 13 
1 33 
2 3 2 
1 45 
2 11 10 
2 52 35 
2 14 12 
1 1 
1 2 
1 3 
2 41 6 
3 45 27 27 
3 37 i i  6 
1 4 
I 4 
3 15 5 4 
1 14 
2 6 2 
2 11 4 
2 32 4 
1 45 
2 41 18 
1 27 
3 48 21 5 
# EL 
0 
37 
50 
50 
50 
3 
40 
24 
50 
50 
6 
40 
50 
50 
50 
50 
40 
46 
40 
5 
24 
37 
5O 
50 
4 
25 
3 
4 
42 
40 
7 
19 
50 
5O 
5O 
50 
26 
0 
18 
5O 
50 
87 
50 
42 
7 
6 
40 
24 
7 
12 
Weak  Dominat ion  
#NEO #Equ i l ib r iumStrateg ies  
3 79 45 41 
i 27 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
3 79 45 15 
1 25 
2 41 7 
1 1 
1 1 
2 32 10 
1 30 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 3O 
2 2 2 
1 3O 
1 2 
2 41 7 
1 19 
1 1 
2 1 
1 33 
2 41 12 
1 13 
1 33 
2 3 2 
1 3O 
2 11 10 
2 52 35 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
2 41 4 
3 45 27 27 
3 37 1t 6 
1 1 
1 1 
3 15 5 4 
1 1 
2 3 3 
2 11 4 
2 32 4 
1 3O 
2 41 14 
1 27 
3 48 21 5 
Randomly Generated Repeated Games 
Table 5. Equilibrium payoffs. 
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Game 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
lO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
3,1 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
#EO 
3 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
l 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
l 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
3 
1 
2 
(6,8)E (5,6.5) 
(-5,3)E 
(2,-S)E 
(6,3)E (0,3). 
(3,-2)E ( -2, -2) .  
(7,6)E (7,2) 
(3.5,-1.5)E (7,-2)E* (0,-1.5)* (0,-2). 
(7, 7)E (0.5,-1) 
(-2, 7)E 
(2,0) (2,1.5)* 
(7, 1)E (3,-5) 
(7,0)E 
(0,-2)E 
(4,-l)S (9,-2)E* 
(8,0)E (0, -2) .  
(7, 6)E (7, 2) 
(3.5,-1.5)E (7,-2)E* (0,-1.5)* (0, 2)* 
(7, 7)E (0.5,-1) 
(-2, 7)E 
(2,0) (2,1.5). 
(7, 1)E (3,-5) 
(7,o)n 
(0,-2)E 
(4,-1)E (9, -2)E ,  
(8, O)E (o,-2). 
(7,6)E (7,2) 
(3.5, - 1.5)E (7,-2)E* 
(7, 7)E (0.5,-1) 
(-2,7)E 
(2,0) (2,1.5). 
(7, 1)E (3,-5) 
(7,0)E 
(0 , -2 )E  
(4,-I)E (9,-2)E* 
(8,0)E (0,-2)* 
(7,6)E (7,2) 
(0 , -  1.5)* (0, -2)* 
(2,0) (2,1.5). 
(7, 1)E (3,-5) 
(7,0)E 
(0,-2)E 
(4,-1)E (9, -2)E,  
(8,0)E (0,-2). 
(7,6)E (7,2) 
(3.5,- 1.5)E (7,-2)E* (0,-1.5)* (0,-2)* 
(7, 7)E (0.5, -1) 
(-2,7)E 
(2,o) (2,1.5). 
Equilibria Payotf 
(4, 5) 
(0.5, -2)* (0, -3)* 
(7, -2) 
(0,-1)E* (3.5, -2 ) .  
(-2, -,1). 
(o,o), (4,-1), 
(7, -2) 
(0, -1 )E ,  (3.5, -2)* 
(-2, -4). 
(o, o). (4,-1), 
(7, -2) 
(0, -1)E* (3.5,-2), 
(-2, -4), 
(o,o), (4,-1), 
(7, -2 )  
(0,-i)E* (3.5,-2)* 
(-2, -4), 
(o, o). (d,-i). 
(7, -2) 
(0,-1)s. (3.5,-2). 
(-2, -4). 
(-2, 7)E 
(3.5,-1.5)E (7,-2)E* (0, -1.5)* (0, -2)* 
(7, 7)E (0.5,-1) 
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